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Conflicts form an integral part o f social change in all societies. Various theoretical 
insights into conflicts corroborate the above assertion. These include Social 
Darwinism, Modernisation Paradigm and Marxism. It goes without saying therefore 
that conflicts, in and o f themselves, are not necessarily negative phenomena. Conflicts 
become counterproductive and negative once they turn violent and belligerents 
attempt to resolve them by military means. This paper argues that conflicts have 
always been part o f Lesotho’s political history and have undermined the country's 
democratic governance especially as they usually turned violent and protagonists 
attempt to resolve them by military means with or without external backing. The 
paper illustrates this stark reality by focusing on the conflict following the 1998 
election in Lesotho.
Introduction
Lesotho’s entire political history is marked by incessant and protracted 
conflicts. These conflicts, which are both overt and covert, have been 
punctuated by outright violence o f one form or another at different points o f the 
country’s turbulent history. At the heart o f  Lesotho’s multi-facetted conflicts, 
lies the country’s ostensibly insurmountable structural crisis and institutional 
paralysis that have, in particular, beset its post-colonial history. Within this 
structural crisis and institutional paralysis also lies the intense, and at times 
acrimonious, power struggle among the political elite, which most invariably 
is considered tantamount to a struggle for survival given the critical role played 
by the state sector in the overall economic development process. In a word, the
Dr. Khabele Matlosa is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political 
and Administrative Studies, National University of Lesotho.
political elite perceive o f state power as the crucial instrument for economic 
accumulation and the contestation for this power turns into a zero-sum game 
and most often than not becomes an end in itself and in the process national 
development suffers.
Various theoretical frameworks have been applied to understand the root causes 
o f  conflicts especially in developing societies. Social Darwinism, which is a 
conceptual framework that is traceable to the classical works o f  Charles 
Darwin, traces the roots o f conflicts to human nature. It propounds that the 
social character humankind is premised on constant fear and the urge for 
survival in its hostile environment. Societies, therefore, will always be engulfed 
in perpetual conflicts. Classical Marxism also sees conflicts as natural and 
inevitable, once a society experiences class cleavages, emergence o f private 
property and state formation. Contrary to Darwinism, Marxism sees conflicts 
as necessarily systemic phenomena, and not so much inherent in humankind. 
The modernisation school also sees conflicts as premised on self-interest of 
actors in competition over scarce resources a la Adam Smith. Another strand 
o f  modernisation theory views conflicts as directly linked to the inevitable 
contradiction o f  high political mobilisation and defective and enfeebled 
institutions in developing countries.
This paper provides a sketchy survey of the Lesotho conflict following the 1998 
election. It focuses on four main aspects o f the conflict: (a) the root causes of 
the conflict; (b) the nature o f  the conflict; (c) conflict management strategies; 
and (d) the political settlement and prospects for stability. The discussion in the 
paper also attempts to blend and weave together the analysis o f  the conflict 
patterns and dynamics in Lesotho with a commentary on prospects for stability 
and democratic governance.
A Conceptual Frame of Analysis
Although conflicts are inherent in all societies, the concept ‘conflict’ remains 
both nebulous and elusive in social science discourse (see Schellenberg, 1982). 
Some scholars trace conflicts to human behaviour and competition over scarce 
resources, while others link it to incompatible interests, choices and goals
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between two or more parties (Deng and Zartman, 1991; Ohlson and Stedman, 
1994). Despite varying interpretations o f  conflicts, the thread that weaves 
various analyses o f conflict together is that all conflict situations have, as their 
raison de’tre, competition/survival strategy, resources/power, interests/values. 
So, essentially, these three elements constitute the critical triangle o f all 
conflicts in all societies. Conflicts arise, in a social setting, when two or more 
parties contest distribution o f resources/power and interests/values for survival 
in an environment where all parties are unable to share these resources and 
values in a mutually equitable and interdependent fashion. Conflicts occur at 
various levels o f  society: the micro-level (ie family/household); the meso-level 
(organisations such as industrial firms) and the macro-level (national level). 
Besides intra-state conflicts, there are also inter-state conflicts. During the Cold 
War and apartheid era, Southern Africa experienced more inter-state conflicts 
that were either directly or indirectly linked to South Africa’s regional strategy 
of destabilisation (Martin and Johnson, 1986; Sejanamane, 1994). Currently a 
majority o f conflicts in the region are intra-state conflicts linked to the crisis of 
the state and resource distribution (see Benjamin and Gregory, 1992; Ohlson 
and Stedman,' 1994).
It is behind this background that the concept ‘conflict’ is used in this paper to 
denote the incompatibility o f interests, choices, goals and ideas over the 
distribution o f  power and scarce resources among many actors (Matlosa, 
1998a). Conflicts arise from interaction among parties who have “ incompatible 
ends [or aims and objectives] in which the ability o f  one actor to gain his/her 
ends depends to an important degree on the choices or decisions another actor 
will take” (cited in Musambachime, 1998:61). Following on Peter 
Wallensteen’s conceptualisation (1988), Ohlson and Stedman define conflict 
as a social situation in which “at least two parties try to acquire the same set o f  
scarce material or immaterial resources at the same time” (1994:13).
It is, therefore, axiomatic that it is in the nature o f society and social 
engineering that conflicts occur and recur over time. Put somewhat differently, 
the fact that societies are beset by conflicts should not necessarily be cause for 
alarm or fatalistic despair. A conflict, in and o f itself, is not an undesirable or 
destructive phenomenon in social change. Conflict may, in fact, be very
necessary to move societies forward and transform social relations in a positive 
direction for a durable and sustainable peace, reconciliation and political 
stability. However, once a conflict situation assumes violent proportions, it 
becomes both undesirable and counter-productive (see Gutteridge and Spence, 
1997). More so if such a conflict keeps escalating causing massive destruction 
to both human life and property. The on-going conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) is a clear case in point.
Social Darwinism perceives o f conflict as inherent in human nature. The 
biological, physical and social character o f mankind is seen as predicated On 
fear and the constant urge for survival in a naturally hostile environment 
(Schellingberg, 1982). Charles Darwin likened human life to experiences in the 
animal kingdom where the rule of thumb is survival o f  the fittest in a manner 
that social life is founded on and sustained by rivalry. Following closely on the 
footsteps o f social Darwinism, the renowned French sociologist, Emile 
Durkheim, reckoned that the transition from the traditional (G em einschaft) to 
the modern society (Gesellschaft) led to the “dissolution o f the old ties of 
mechanical solidarity which bound people together in the close-knit 
communities o f  pre-industrial society. The interpersonal bonds had depended 
on spatial contiguity and personal acquaintance, and had broken down with the 
changes attendant on the emergence o f  modern society, particularly 
urbanisation. These changes had led to a progressive depersonalisation of 
society ... .” (Roxborough, 979:3). The depersonalisation o f  society and the 
concomitant process o f individualism, in turn, lead to social alienation (the 
anomie factor), itself a contributory factor to social conflicts o f  various forms 
and magnitudes.
In strict classical Marxist parlance, the history o f all class-divided societies is 
the history of protracted class struggles. Marx and Engels are more forthright 
and unambiguous on this assertion which is so central to the Marxist conception 
o f  human history: “the modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the 
ruins o f feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but 
established new classes, new conditions o f oppression, new forms o f struggle 
in place o f the old ones” (1968:36). For Marxists, therefore, conflicts are not 
only inevitable, but are also necessary if society is to advance and remain
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dynamic. The social structure is crucial in understanding human behaviour; 
thus contl icts are explained, from a Marxist perspective, in terms o f the manner 
of interaction between the base and superstructure. In other words, conflicts 
always have to do with either class struggle or systemic failure or both at any 
given level o f  social interaction atr any time in the history o f  social 
development (Schellenberg, 1982).
For modernisation theorists o f  the likes o f  Adam Smith, social conflict is 
predicated upon self-interest o f  various actors and forces within the 
marketplace. So conflict, in Smithian terms, is both endemic and central to 
social advancement. At the heart o f  conflicts are “parties pursuing interests 
which are not fully harmonious. Adam Smith was among those who saw 
interest conflicts as perfectly normal. It is natural that each individual has his 
own interests and that these may often be in some degree o f conflict with the 
interests of others” (Schellingberg, 1982:51). Another strand of modernisation 
perspective o f conflict or instability in developing countries was the one 
developed by the American political scientist, Samuel Huntington (1968). For 
him, much of the conflicts or what he termed political decay in these countries 
is caused mainly by a profound contradiction between high political 
mobilisation and low level o f institutionalisation. The argument here is that 
once the populace is highly mobilised, it places increased demands on the 
political system. If the political system is characterised by defective and 
enfeebled institutions, it is unable to deliver to satisfy demands o f a mobilised 
populace. Where institutions in a political system have “ little power, less 
majesty, and no resiliency..., governments simply do not govern" (Huntington, 
1968:2). This then results in deep-seated political conflicts and instability, 
which most invariably paralyses governance and the state system in a majority 
of developing states. Political instability/decay in most developing countries, 
argues Huntington, is “ in large part the product of rapid social change and rapid 
mobilisation o f new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of 
political institutions” (1968:4). For Darwin and Smith, the unit o f  analysis for 
social conflicts is the individual (human nature and rational choice), while for 
Huntington and the Marxists it is the institutions and social system (institutional 
functionalism and structural determinism). Here we have an epistemological 
conflict in the conceptualisation o f social conflicts: is it a combination of
systems and institutions or is it the behaviour o f individual members o f  society 
that help us better fathom the roots, nature and magnitude o f  societal conflicts?
This article grapples with these complex issues focusing on the conflict in 
Lesotho at the macro-level o f  the state and micro-level o f  individual actors. We 
assess the root causes o f  the conflict, probing into its dynamics over time, 
interrogating its critical determinants, highlighting the key players and 
examining the core issues at the heart of the conflict. The mechanisms used for 
resolving or at least managing the conflict are also put under spotlight. While 
a conflict, per se, is not a necessarily counterproductive development, two most 
important features easily turn it into a social liability: (a) once it turns 
irreversibly violent; and (b) once it cannot be resolved by peaceful means, viz. 
negotiation. Violence is an antithesis o f  political settlement o f  social conflicts 
and usually tends to lead to escalation rather than de-escalation o f conflicts. 
Peaceful means o f  settlement o f  conflicts is a process that involves one or a 
combination o f the following:
• Transforming the system of actors, issues and actions away from focus 
on incompatibilities to compatibilities (principled compromise);
• Reducing level o f destructive behaviour o f  violence to non-violent 
levels even if basic incompatibilities still exist (conflict de-escalation 
and containment o f  violence);
• Solving the basic incompatibilities as perceived by the protagonists, so 
that a mutually satisfactory, sustainable and durable political settlement 
is reached (eradication o f  incompatibilities); and
• Transforming the entire conflict mapping and changing the relationship 
between the protagonists from one o f conflict to that o f  peace (conflict 
transformation and peace-building) (Ohlson and Stedman, 1994:13- 
14).
Lesotho experienced the most profound conflict in its entire history in the 
immediate aftermath o f the 1998 general election. The key protagonists in the 
conflict were the ruling party and some of the opposition parties, ostensibly 
contesting the outcome of the election, yet the subterranean field o f the conflict 
transcended the election outcome. Although the opposition parties and the
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ruling party played a primary role in the conflict, the monarchy and security 
establishment played a secondary role. The role o f the monarchy in the recent 
conflict is relatively difficult to untangle compared to that o f  the security 
establishment. This is so for a variety o f reasons, the primary one being that 
King Letsie III had to exercise a lot o f  restraint during the conflict lest he was 
deemed poised to repeat the 1994 ‘coup’ which invited external intervention 
led by South Africa (Matlosa, 1994). Other commentators argue that the 
camping o f the opposition parties outside the Palace gates amounted to tacit 
support o f  the monarch to their cause. The failure of the security establishment 
to contain the conflict within the parameters o f  law and order was generally 
interpreted as complicity, thus turning it into a party to the conflict.
Equally important to the configuration o f power among the protagonists in the 
conflict was the involvement of external forces, notably South Africa and 
Botswana, purportedly under the umbrella o f the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). With the failure o f  initial attempts to 
manage the conflict by peaceful means and preventive diplomacy, it escalated 
into open violence, leading to loss of lives and destruction of property. With the 
security machinery unable or unprepared to re-establish law and order, the 
political situation rapidly deteriorated and government was paralysed. When the 
opposition supporters hijacked the state-run Radio Lesotho and a mutiny 
occurred in the Lesotho Defence force (LDF), the Prime Minister quickly 
requested external military assistance. A positive response came from South 
Africa and Botswana in September 1998 when their troops arrived in Lesotho 
purportedly to come and restore political stability. The negotiations among the 
protagonists, under the mediation o f South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe, culminated in an agreement on the following, among others:
1) the holding o f a fresh election in the year 2000;
2) the establishment of the Interim Political Authority (IPA) charged with 
the mandate to oversee, in liaison with the government, preparations 
for the election; and
3) the restructuring o f the Independent Electoral Commission.
This paper investigates the broader dynamics and ramifications of this conflict.
It does not, however, attempt to provide an exhaustive treatise o f  all the 
elements o f  the conflict for that would require a complete book publication in 
its own right. The discussion is confined mainly to (a) the root causes o f the 
conflict; (b) the nature o f  the conflict; (c) conflict management strategies; and 
(d) prospects and challenges for stability and democratic governance. The key 
assumptions of the paper are as follows:
• The conflict expressed the country’s historic structural and institutional 
crisis;
• Two conflict management strategies were used, namely negotiation and 
military force, with the latter gaining upper-hand, and thus being 
crucial in both creating a climate for the political settlement and its 
sustenance;
• The current political settlement is a positive development, which, if 
well managed, could deliver stability in Lesotho and thus contributing 
positively to democratic governance. Conversely, if the settlement is 
not managed well, a real risk still exists for reverting back into another 
deep-seated conflict with a great potential for state collapse a la 
Zartman (1995).
The Root Causes o f the Conflict
Most commentators and observers o f the Lesotho political scene have attempted 
to explain the current conflict by reference to the 1998 election. This 
explanation is plausible only to a limited extent for it fails to identify causal 
factors besides and beyond the election. The 1998 election was only one, 
probably the most obvious, dimension o f this multi-faceted political crisis. A 
critical assessment o f  the current conflict suggests that it has deep historical 
roots in Lesotho’s institutional crisis and constitutional disorder since 
independence (Weisfelder, 1967; Makoa, 1994; Matlosa, 1997a). A sketchy 
outline o f  this dimension o f the conflict is in order. First, during the period 
1965-70, Lesotho experienced what could be termed an embryonic democracy. 
Foundations o f post-independence political development were laid by the 1965 
election. The radical Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), most popular and well- 
organised of all the contestants, had been predicted the winner o f  this election
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by most observers. The royalist amalgam styled Marema-Tlou Freedom Party 
(MFP), which had just suffered a split some couple o f years prior to the 
election, was not considered a critical force. By some twist o f  irony, however, 
the outcome of the election was a surprise victory o f the conservative 
Basotuland National Party (BNP) as illustrated in Table 1 below.
Table 1: 1965 General election for the National Assembly
Contestants No. o f  votes % of votes No. o f  seats
BNP 108 162 41.6 31
BCP 103 050 39.7 25
MFP 42 837 16.5 4
MTP 5 697 2.2 0
Indepts 79 0.03 0
Total 259 825 100 60
Source: Matlosa, 1997b: 142.
Although the enraged BCP accepted the election outcome, there was a lingering 
suspicion that the process was not free and fair. The BCP could not bring itself 
to believe that they had won the 1960 local government election with a 
landslide victory, only to perform badly in the general election just some five 
years down the line (Matlosa, 1997b). The BNP victory was, however, to all 
intents and purposes, a narrow one which had ensured their assumption of state 
power mainly due to the first-past-the-post electoral system bequeathed from 
the British colonial administration. Although the BNP got 42% of the votes 
against the BCP’s 40%, the latter had no role in government for the electoral 
system ensured a one-party rule. Lesotho attained political independence the 
following year under the BNP rule. The country experienced some relative 
stability during this period. The political and constitutional foundations of 
Lesotho’s embryonic democracy were not firmly rooted. Second, the period 
1970-86, which we refer to as the era of de facto one-party dictatorship, was the 
most turbulent part o f  Lesotho's political history. It began with the seizure of
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power by the BNP after the farcical 1970 election, which was clearly won by 
the BCP, but the ruling party refused to abide by the rules o f the game and thus 
subverted the verdict o f  the electorate. The BCP had undoubtedly prepared 
itself very well for this contest, aiming to upset its arch-rival -  the BNP- and 
reverse the 1965 political outcome. It capitalised on policy failures o f the BNP 
with its urban-biased development strategy and the marginalisation o f certain 
regions, which were perceived as stronghold of the opposition, eg the mountain 
areas. It is no wonder, therefore, that despite the BNP’s reliance on state 
resources and massive support from apartheid South Africa, Britain and West 
Germany, the BCP won the election with a comfortable margin as shown in 
Table Two below.
Table 2: 1970 General election for the National Assembly
Contestants No. o f  votes % of votes No. o f  seats
BNP 152 907 49.8 36
BCP 108 162 42.2 23
MFP 22 279 7.3 1
Other 1 909 0.7 0
Total 285 257 100 60
Source: Southall and Petlane, 1995:42.
The BNP annulled the electoral process as the returns from the polling stations 
confirmed the BCP victory. This party continued its rule, having denied a 
legitimate winner an opportunity to govern on the basis o f  a mandate acquired 
through a popular vote. Since then, Lesotho politics was marked by patronage, 
repression and accommodation as the ruling party aimed to ensure the perpetual 
reproduction over time o f a de facto one-party state under its unchallenged 
command. Reliance on repression also meant that the ruling party would anchor 
statecraft upon the security machinery and for this reason, the security 
establishment was not only beefed up, but highly politicised (Southall and 
Petlane, 1995; Mothibe, 1997; Matlosa, 1998). After an abortive election of
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1985, this era o f  one-party dictatorship ended with a military coup that 
displaced the BNP government in 1986 after a long period o f sour relations 
between the ruling party and the military itself. The apartheid government in 
South Africa took advantage o f this wedge between the executive organ and the 
security establishment in Lesotho in its destabilisation o f the country and 
helped precipitate the military coup (Edgar, 1987; Ajulu, 1986; Hassan, 1986; 
Matlosa, 1998b). Third, the period 1986-93, which can be termed the era of 
military authoritarianism, saw the deeper entrenchment o f  the military in 
Lesotho's political landscape. Two most important developments during this 
era were (a) the deepening indiscipline within the army, a trend that is common 
to all military governments throughout Africa (see Hutchful and Bathily, 1998), 
and (b) the entrenched interest of the military in active politics and state power. 
Over and above, the Lesotho politics was overtly militarised. Although the 
military withdrew from state power in the early 1990s, their interest in politics 
and how the state is managed remained strong. The 1993 election which acted 
as a mid-wife to the withdrawal o f the military from state power, was won 
overwhelmingly by the BCP, but the BNP challenged the election outcome 
crying foul (Sekatle, 1995). The outcome of this election is shown in Table 3 
below.
T able  3: 1993 G en era l election o f  the N ational A ssem b ly
Contestants No. o f  votes % of votes No. of seats
BNP 398 355 74.7 65
BCP 120 686 22.6 0
MFP 7 650 1.4 0
Other 6 287 1.2 0
Total 532 978 100 65
Source: Southall and Petlane, 1995:42.
It was to be expected, therefore, that, a civilian government that assumed power 
after the military withdrawal would find it difficuit to institutionalise civil
control over the forces and be able to effectively demilitarise the political 
sphere. But the speed with which civil-military relations deteriorated and 
abruptly collapsed into open and violent conflicts shocked even the keen 
observers o f  Lesotho’s political scene. Mutual suspicions marked the sour 
relations between the two and occasionally these erupted into protracted and 
violent conflicts that have invited external intervention mainly by the Southern 
African states with South Africa playing a lead role (Southall and Petlane, 
1995; Matlosa, 1994; Makoa, 1998).
Surely, a government without a meaningful control and authority over the 
security establishment is bound ultimately to become a lame duck or a paper 
tiger, so to speak. Lack o f civil control over the security establishment leads to 
two power blocs (i.e. the security organ and the executive organ o f the state) 
that constantly contest state power through either covert or overt means. This 
has indeed been the key dilemma that has brutally confronted Lesotho since the
1993 election. Given the monopoly o f  violence enjoyed by the security 
establishment, most invariably, the power equation tilts in favour o f  the military 
and the government effectively becomes a lame Leviathan, in strict Hobbesian 
terms. Fourth and finally, the period 1993-98 can be characterised as the era of 
fragile democracy, which was marked by intense political instability in between 
the elections of 1993 and 1998. Despite the 1993 election which was hailed as 
the first ever democratic election since the country's independence, the country 
still experienced one-party rule with a fairly insignificant role for the opposition 
in the process o f governance. This, o f  course, had a lot to do with the nature of 
the electoral system, much as it had something to do with the low level of 
institutionalisation of the political system itself as well as the entrenched class 
interests of the ruling party. It was no consternation, therefore, that in no time, 
the new government locked horns in protracted and internecine conflicts with 
other key organs of the state such as the security establishment, the bureaucracy 
and the monarchy/chieftainship. This situation helped considerably to paralyse 
the system of governance. But it was further worsened by the internal power 
struggles within the ruling party that resulted in the split o f  the party into two 
factions and ultimately the emergence of a splinter group, the Lesotho Congress 
for Democracy (LCD) (see Pule, 1997; Matlosa, 1997a; Sekatle, 1997; 
Weisfelder, 1997). The 1998 election took place under a very volatile political
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environment marked in the main by mutual suspicion, mistrust and intrigue 
among key political actors. Its outcome, which is illustrated in Table 4 below, 
was both interesting and perplexing for a new party grabbed almost all seats in 
the National Assembly.
T able  4: 1998 G enera l election for the N ational A ssem b ly
Contestants No. o f  votes % of votes No. o f  seats
LCD 355 049 60.7 79
BNP 143 073 24.5 1
BCP 61 793 10.6 0
MFP 7 460 1.3 0
Other 16 244 2.9 0
Total 584 740 100 80
Source: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Provisional Results,
May 27, 1998.
By the time o f the 1998 election, therefore, the writing on the wall was clear: 
a political confrontation among the political elite was imminent. But nobody 
predicted that it would take the form it did and assume the magnitude that it 
did. Political tensions rose sharply and a couple of months after the election, an 
unprecedented conflict was already simmering.
However, political instability in Lesotho is not only a manifestation of 
institutional decay and constitutional disorder, it is also a mirror-image o f an 
age-old structural crisis marked by (a) a resource-poor labour reserve economy; 
(b) a predominantly state-based accumulation trajectory; (c) landlockedness 
and (d) external dependence which impinge on its sovereignty and security. 
Under conditions o f a weak resource endowment and poverty, everybody looks 
up to the state to provide the basic necessities o f  survival. When the state is, as 
is often the case, unable to deliver, its legitimacy and credibility hang in 
balance. Further more, given the weak domestic private sector, the state is
viewed as a critical vehicle for accumulation by the political elite, hence the 
struggle over state power does not only become fierce, but acrimonious too 
(Ake, 1979; Chabal, 1994; Ake, 1996). Politics is then seen not as a positive- 
sum game but a zero-sum game wherein winner takes all and attempts to 
vanquish the opponents either by fair or foul means. Over and above, 
landlockedness and extreme external dependence also add to the structural 
determinants o f  conflicts in Lesotho. The landlocked and impoverished Lesotho 
has always depended on such external sources o f  capital formation as foreign 
aid, migrant remittances, dividends accruing from the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU). We can now add to this list the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project from which the country will derive royalties from water transfer 
to South Africa. The first three factors o f  capital accumulation are all on the 
decline since the demise o f apartheid (UN, 1995) and further more foreign 
direct investment has been difficult to attract due mainly to political unrest in 
the country (Tangri, 1993). All these developments suggest that traditional 
sources o f  state revenue and employment creation are fast shrinking. As this 
happens, the struggle over scarce resources intensifies. The struggle over state 
power among the political elite intensifies further, for the elite perceives that 
power as a cheap licence for accumulation (Chabal, 1994; Ake, 1996), given 
the weak economic base o f this social stratum.
The conflict itself revolved around three key issues: (a) legitimacy o f the 
government; (b) political participation and (c) distribution o f resources. The 
opposition parties challenged the legitimacy o f the LCD government on the 
grounds o f alleged electoral fraud. The agreement to hold a fresh election in the 
year 2000 is an attempt to resolve this legitimacy crisis. Given the constituency- 
based electoral system, Lesotho’s most recent successive elections o f  1993 and 
1998 produced a de facto one-party rule, which generates discontent over 
political participation by the opposition. Part o f  the mandate o f  the I PA is to 
review the current electoral system and move the system towards a more 
inclusive electoral model. In politics, power is the most important resource. Its 
distribution is very crucial in all political systems. Over-centralisation o f power 
quickly lends itself to authoritarian rule and political instability, while some 
form o f  decentralisation could easily contribute to the establishment of a 
pluralist democracy. The establishment of the 1PA is, in part, meant to give the
1 76 Conflict and Conflict Management
Lesotho Social Science Review Vol. 5 No. 1 177
opposition parties a stake in state power, at least in relation to the electoral 
process. In this manner, it provides a modicum of power-sharing between 
government and the opposition which contest the legitimacy of the government 
itself
The Nature of the Conflict
Although much o f the issues in the current conflict are directly linked to the 
1998 election, the roots o f the conflict are traceable to the structural and 
institutional crisis discussed above. The issues of the conflict also help us better 
define the nature and character o f  the conflict itself. At the macro-level of 
analysis, the political impasse in Lesotho could be seen as part o f  the historical 
structural and institutional crisis. At the micro-level of analysis, it can be linked 
directly to the protracted internal faction-fighting within the then ruling BCP 
since the 1993 election (see Pule, 1997; Matlosa, 1997; Sekatle, 1997). A few 
months after the 1993 election, serious cracks began to show within the ranks 
of the ruling party. Increasingly internal feuding within the party intensified and 
two distinct factions emerged. The Maporesha (pressure group) comprised the 
enlightened young turks who were eager to institutionalise some administrative 
and leadership reforms in the party. The Majelathoko (those who eat alone) 
faction was composed o f the conservative old guard that was bent on 
maintaining the status quo and the leadership style and personalities that have 
been the order of the day since 1952. This power struggle, which also hinged 
on succession given the advanced age o f the then leader, culminated in a major 
split o f  the ruling party. Out o f  this split emerged the Lesotho Congress for 
Democracy (LCD) in June 1997, led by the late Ntsu Mokhehle, the then Prime 
Minister. The Prime Minister announced in parliament that the new party would 
form government and displace the one that won the 1993 election, which will 
in turn become the official opposition in the National Assembly. Justifying his 
surprise political volte face that complicated the political chess game for the 
opposition and also making a swipe at his opponents within the party, 
Mokhehle proclaimed that
I, and those who support me, have tried to restore normality in the affairs o f  the 
party, but it is now clear to us that these gentlemen, in fact, stand to benefit 
from this confusion; their strategy seems to be to drag the issue, so that, come
election time, they should be the ones in control, even if this against the wishes
o f the majority in the party (cited in Matlosa, 1997:243).
The two factions engaged in a fierce power struggle which was driven by 
neither policy nor ideological differences, but rather by leadership squabbles 
and how best to share the spoils o f  state power (Matlosa, 1997a; Weisfelder, 
1997; Gay, 1998). As the LCD emerged, it commanded a majority support of 
40 seats against the BCP’s 23 seats in the National Assembly. It was in this 
ground that the BCP. a party that had been put into power through a popular 
vote, was relegated to an official opposition party in parliament. Enraged by 
the Prime Minister’s unexpected political volte face, which they dubbed a coup 
d'etat, the BCP refused to assume the role o f  official opposition in parliament, 
but instead appealed to the King and the SADC countries to reinstate the 
elected government. Subsequently, the BCP joined forces with the Basotho 
National Party (BNP) and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) in their 
condemnation o f Ntsu Mokhehle's action that they interpreted as a 
parliamentary coup par excellence. This alliance called upon the King to 
dissolve the LCD government, form a government o f national unity and 
postpone the election. At this stage, while the former called on the King to 
dissolve the LCD government and reinstate the BCP government, the latter two 
advocated a formation o f a government o f  national unity and postponement of 
the 1998. The King did not dissolve the LCD government for the constitution 
would not allow him to do so. Besides, he would not subject himself and the 
institution o f monarchy to another awkward political predicament as the one in
1994 when he temporarily displaced the BCP and had to reinstate it under 
extreme duress. The SADC countries also did not respond to the appeals by the 
opposition parties. They watched as the political crisis unfolded and ultimately 
erupted into a deep-seated conflict. The seeds of the current conflict in Lesotho 
are, therefore, linked to events prior to the 1998 election and to link them 
merely to the election, as Tsie (1998) does, is to miss the point. A plausible 
explanation of the Lesotho conflict is the one that sees it as both historical and 
structural and this is what Gay’s (1998) refreshing analysis does, although it has 
one pitfall of reducing the conflict to a ‘tug-of-war’ between the traditionalists 
and commoners. This author’s view is that the conflict was more broader than 
the ro>alist-commoner dichotomy in both form and content and had deeper 
roots that transcended the election and its outcome.
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Despite assurances by legal and political experts that the LCD government was 
properly constituted given the Westminster parliamentary system and the 
national Constitution, the formation o f the LCD and its rule resulted in a deep 
sense o f bitterness among the political elite and thus contributed to the already 
profound polarisation o f Lesotho's political society. The opposition parties had 
already started a series o f  activities aimed at either unseating or at least 
destabilising the LCD rule, which they deemed as illegitimate and 
unconstitutional. They only relaxed pressure as elections drew closer, thereby 
suspending protest action hoping to unseat the government through the ballot. 
As ballot failed to do the desired trick, the opposition alliance reverted back to 
their protest action, this time with more vigour.
This political turmoil almost paralysed Lesotho’s legislature as the Lower 
House was divided into two warring factions which exchanged a litany of 
abusive language on the floor o f  the House to the extent that the police had to 
be invited to drag some members out o f  the House as the Speaker seemed to 
lose control. Besides, the Upper House (Senate) also got embroiled in this 
political impasse. The House was highly critical o f  the Prime Minister’s move 
that it perceived as a subversion and travesty of democratic governance. It than 
passed a resolution that it would not consider any bills from the National 
Assembly. Furthermore, Senate also requested the King to dissolve parliament 
and force the Prime Minister to call a fresh election.
As the election date drew closer, the political bitterness among the contestants 
became more and more pronounced. The animosity and the rivalry were real as 
the opposition parties aimed to either dislodge or destabilise the LCD 
government through both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary' means. Extra- 
parliamentary pressure was relaxed as the election approached with the 
assumption that the newly formed LCD would be defeated. However, to the 
chagrin o f the opposition parties, the LCD won the election with an unexpected 
overwhelming majority as illustrated in table 4 above. Unexpected partly 
because the LCD was a new horse contesting the race for the first time with 
well-trodden horses with an established history in Lesotho's political landscape 
and partly because its emergence was assumed to have enraged not only the 
opposition parties, but the entire nation. The political bitterness and polarisation
in society notwithstanding, LCD won almost all the seats and left its opponents 
stranded. Once more, the first-past-the-post electoral system had delivered 
another one-party government in Lesotho.
Rather than deepen Lesotho’s democracy, the election added to the country’s 
multivariate conflicts among the political elite. It is worth noting that these 
conflicts were already in existence even prior to the election. What the election 
merely did was to hasten their momentum and deepen their magnitude. In a 
nutshell, the election, in and o f itself, was not the cause for the conflict that 
nearly turned into a civil war in the country. As we have argued, the conflict is 
historical in form and structural in content and, thus, cannot be sufficiently 
explained by reference to any one single political episode, such as an election. 
The 1998 election had its specific contribution to the on-going conflict in 
Lesotho in that its outcome deepened the political bitterness which had been 
occasioned by the BCP split and the subsequent LCD rule. The outcome of the 
election, like all others since 1965, did not only generate more conflicts among 
the political elite, but exposed the absurdity o f  the first-past-the-post electoral 
system, which most invariably gives unfair advantage to a dominant party over 
all others. Initially, the opposition parties challenged the election outcome 
through the courts o f  law. When that strategy failed to live up to their 
expectation, they switched to protest marches and demonstrations. They further 
appealed to the King and some SADC countries especially Botswana, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe (guarantors o f  Lesotho's democracy since 1994) to 
dissolve the elected government and help establish a government o f national 
unity -  the same demand they had made prior to the election. Once more, their 
demand was not met. As the opposition parties pressed more for their demands, 
political tensions rose astronomically. The belligerent parties seemed poised to 
brace for outright confrontation. The opposition parties camped outside the 
Palace gates, purportedly awaiting a response from the King on their key 
demands. The ruling party condemned its opponents in the strongest terms 
possible. The parties to the conflict held steadfastly to their positions without 
any noticeable indication for compromise and a strive towards a win-win 
solution to the conflict. In the end, the conflict escalated and assumed violent 
proportions with considerable cost to human life and property.
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Although internal efforts were made to bring the belligerent parties together to 
negotiate some political settlement, external actors played a greater role which 
drove the process to the current settlement. During the early stages o f  the 
conflict, a Lesotho Crisis Committee was formed comprising the Lesotho 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI), the Lesotho Network for Conflict 
Management (LNCM), the Lesotho Council for Non-governmental 
Organisations (LCN), the Heads o f Churches and the Lesotho Youth 
Federation (LYF). The crisis committee attempted to bring about a peaceful 
resolution o f the conflict by creating a climate for direct talks between the 
belligerent parties. The Committee organised a crucial meeting whereby the 
opposition alliance and the government reached the following agreement:
to seek to normalise life especially in the capital city, Maseru; to remove 
vigilante groups from the streets and allow normal traffic flow;
I. to allow humanitarian relief to go to those most affected by the conflict 
and provision o f essential services such as access to hospitals, food 
shops, banks and funeral services;
II. parties to commit themselves to an independent audit of the election 
results as suggested by the South African Deputy President, Thabo 
Mbeki.
However, mutual mistrust and suspicions that the parties harboured towards 
each other led to the collapse o f these early efforts, including the above 
agreement. The spotlight quickly focused on external efforts still aimed at 
finding a solution to the conflict.
Central to external efforts to resolve Lesotho’s political conflict was the role of 
South Africa, Lesotho’s only immediate neighbour. On the 10th August 1998, 
a delegation from South Africa comprising Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, 
Foreign Affairs Minister, Alfred Nzo, and Defence Minister, Joe Modise, jetted 
into Maseru with a view to help quell the turmoil. This delegation met 
representatives of both parties whereupon an agreement was reached that a
team of' experts from the SADC region would be formed to investigate 
allegations o f irregularities during the election. Consequently, a tripartite 
commission o f inquiry involving representatives from South Africa, Botswana 
and Zimbabwe, headed by Pius Langa o f the South African constitutional court, 
was established.
T he work o f  the Commission proceeded at a painstakingly slow pace, resulting 
in delays in submission o f the final report. As the report got delayed, political 
tempers kept rising in Lesotho, resulting in small-scale armed conflicts between 
the supporters o f  the belligerent parties leading to deaths and injuries. In the 
meantime, the opposition parties had begun a campaign o f destabilising the 
government and rendering the country ungovernable. To this end, the 
opposition parties called on the public to refrain from coming to work on 
specific days. Their supporters would enforce these threats by mounting road 
blockades, terrorising street vendors, burning tyres, looting some shops. 
Further more, armed youth gangs from both sides o f  warring parties engaged 
in skirmishes in the capital, Maseru, which claimed lives and caused damage 
to property. Not only did the security establishment fail to bring the situation 
under control, but political loyalties turned them into partisan actors in a 
conflict that was slowly gravitating towards civil war. Even after a long delay, 
when the Langa Repoil ultimately came out on September 1 7, its contents only 
hardened the original positions o f the conflicting parties for the allegations that 
the election was rigged were neither confirmed nor disproved. Consider, for 
instance, the follow ing observation from the Report itself:
We are unable to state that the validity o f  the elections has been conclusively 
established. We point out. however, that some o f  the apparent irregularities and 
discrepancies are sufficiently serious concerns. We cannot, however, postulate 
that the result does not reflect the will o f  the Lesotho electorate. We merely 
point out that the means for checking this has been compromised and created 
much room for doubt (p.28).
As this passage indicates, the Langa Report was full o f  vague and inconclusive 
statements which essentially failed to give the electoral process a clean bill of 
health, but at the same time not making a definitive case for the opposition 
parties. In this way. the report provided a moral ammunition for both sides to 
claim some imaginary and pyrrhic victory: a right recipe for a precipitous
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escalation o f the conflict. Gay aptly observes that “ the report was a 
disappointment. It appeared to give everyone something to cheer about, and 
basically blamed the Independent Electoral Commission for having made a 
mess of the election" (1998:3). The Langa Commission, thus, played an 
insignificant role as a conflict management tool for its outcome did not bring 
the parties together to some mutually acceptable political settlement. Given that 
Basotho had pinned all their hopes on the Langa report to at least help the 
belligerent parties to settle their differences, when the report failed to do that 
the conflict escalated. Attitudes were hardened further and parties to the 
conflict continue to drift apart, thus, making it well-nigh impossible to strive 
towards a negotiated settlement. The opposition parties mounted their 
offensive. The ruling party also braced itself for the tug-of-war. At this stage, 
it was clear that the parties were ready to take up a fight. Each was desperately 
looking forward to the security establishment and the monarchy to tilt the 
balance of forces in its favour so as to have an edge in the conflict and force its 
adversary into acquiescence. By their own words and deeds, the parties seemed 
to have jettisoned a negotiated settlement, at least on their own. Taking 
advantage o f  the reluctance (in some instances complicity) o f  the security 
establishment, the opposition parties confiscated many government vehicles, 
closed government offices and captured the State Radio station. Not only did 
the security establishment watch chaos and anarchy unfold and take a toll on 
human life and property, but tensions within the forces began to show. The 
police and the military exchanged fire around the Palace gates on August 17 
resulting in one death and many injuries. Later, lower ranks in the army 
undertook a mutiny by forcing the commander to dismiss about 28 high-ranking 
army personnel and to tender his resignation over the Radio. The commander 
and those purportedly dismissed officers later sought refuge in South Africa. 
Although these developments had all the markings of some conspiracy to topple 
the government, they did not in their own way amount to a coup as yet. A coup 
d'etat is a situation whereby a de jure government has been effectively 
displaced by unlawful means by a person or group o f persons who in turn 
impose a de facto authority. A situation o f this nature had not yet happened, 
even if some elements within the opposition camp could have planned it. What 
was not in doubt, though, was the fact that the activities o f  the opposition 
parties, combined with the complicity o f  the security establishment had
effectively paralysed the government and destabilised the entire management 
o f  national affairs. As the conflict escalated and the security situation 
deteriorated, the government o f  Lesotho requested military assistance from 
Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique.
Military Intervention and Negotiations
When the Lesotho government appealed for external military assistance, it 
became abundantly clear that all initial attempts at preventive diplomacy, 
including the Langa Commission, had not delivered desired results. It was also 
clear that the external military intervention was meant to bolster a threatened 
state. It was therefore never meant to be an impartial instrument in the conflict 
situation. The Lesotho Prime Minister had requested external military 
assistance to restore law and order, arguing that government was held in ransom 
and that the opposition alliance had effected a coup. The critical pillar of the 
Prime Minister's request was the following passage in his letter:
The most serious tragedy is that the police, and in particular the army, are at 
best, spectators. The mutiny in the LDF (Lesotho Defence Force) is taking root.
The brigadier who has been forced to be commander, has had to go into hiding 
because the mutineers have attempted forcing him to announce a coup. 1 le has 
so far refused and fears for his life. In this instance, we have a coup on our 
hands (My emphasis).
This paragraph painted a graphic picture of an impending civil war and a covert 
military coup. The importance o f an allegation of a military coup in this regard 
lies in the fact that it invoked Article 5, section 2 (ib) o f  the draft protocol on 
Politics, Defence and Security in the Southern African Development 
Community which states that one o f the intra-state conflicts that could warrant 
a regional intervention is “a threat to the legitimate authority o f  the government 
(such as a military coup by the armed or para-military forces)” (SADC, 1997). 
Besides a reference to a coup which invoked the SADC protocol, yet another 
ground for involvement of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe, could have 
been the 1994 Memorandum o f  Understanding which was signed to reinstate 
the BCP government after its temporary displacement by King Lestsie 111. 
Article one o f the Memorandum states that “the guarantors commit themselves 
to remain directly involved in this understanding, and shall take all necessary
1 84 Conflict and Conflict Management
embedded and entrenched security and strategic interests o f  South Africa 
(Hough, 1998). This is no idle observation, for in international relations states 
relate to one another in terms o f how best to maximise value o f their own 
interest. First and foremost, South Africa was anxious to protect the multi­
billion dollar Lesotho I fighlands Water Project (LHWP) which it is undertaking 
jointly with Lesotho government to transfer water to South Africa’s industrial 
heartland mainly Johannesburg and Pretoria. It was presumed that the 
escalation o f  the conflict could jeopardise the expected returns from this 
project. Second, South Africa was worried about the possibility o f  this conflict 
degenerating into outright civil war and thereby spilling over into its own 
borders, thus causing havoc especially in the context o f  the impending general 
election o f 1999. Third, in the eyes o f  South African strategists, the Lesotho 
conflict had a huge potential to unleash a massive exodus o f illegal migrants 
and political refugees, an unwelcome phenomenon in the context o f  the rising 
tide o f  xenophobia in that country. Fourth, the South African authorities 
reckoned that the conflict could intensify cross-border trafficking o f illegal 
small arms and narcotics. All these were crucial, albeit unstated, factors that 
principally drove South Africa to intervene militarily in the Lesotho conflict.
The Botswana connection in the Lesotho conflict is relatively difficult to 
explain. Surely Botswana has no immediate security and strategic interests in 
Lesotho. A combination o f various dynamics in Botswana's domestic political 
scene and its regional postures since the recent past could shed some light on 
the rationale for its military intervention in Lesotho. As in the case o f South 
Africa, the official explanation revolves around arguments for restoration of 
political stability in Lesotho, although there is no evidence of a formal bilateral 
agreement. In his speech delivered at the SADC-EU Ministerial Conference in 
Vienna, Austria in early November 1998. the Botswana Foreign Minister, Gen. 
Mompane Merafhe, stated that “SADC countries intervened in Lesotho in order 
to restore constitutional order in that country. It was clearly obvious that 
without this intervention, Lesotho was in real danger of sliding into chaos, with 
the obvious negative consequences on the stability o f  other countries in the 
region” (Emphasis mine). Tsie also concurs that the external military 
intervention had as its raison de’tre, restoration o f law and order after “weeks 
o f  political unrest sparked by the disputed May 1999 election outcome”
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(1998:10). These issues may well have mattered in the scheme of things that 
drove the external actors to intervene militarily. However, there is need to 
transcend conventional wisdom and subject state-centric explanation of 
behaviour o f  external forces towards the Lesotho crisis to some critical analysis. 
For this author, the Botswana involvement in the Lesotho crisis was propelled 
by multiple factors, which were o f a fairly different order from those that 
influenced South Africa. First, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) has a 
considerable influence over major foreign policy and regional security 
projections and postures of the government. The fact that Lt-Gen. Ian Khama, 
former commander o f the BDF, is the new deputy president o f  the ruling 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), places him in a strategic position to 
influence Botswana's regional policy in a way that portrays regional security 
more in military terms and therefore adoption o f militaristic solutions to 
emerging conflicts. Add to this the strategic position held by Gen. Mompane 
Merafhe, BDF founder, as Minister of Foreign Affairs; then clearly the military 
in Botswana is generally strategically placed to have the necessary influence on 
Botswana’s regional policy (Molutsi, 1997; Campbell, 1997). It is easy to infer 
from the above that when the Lesotho crisis became an issue in official circles 
in Botswana, as an official guarantor of Lesotho’s democracy, the views o f the 
securocrats held sway over those o f the bureaucrats, thus leading to a military 
intervention. Second, militarism is a phenomenon that is on the increase in 
Southern Africa, including South Africa and Botswana, and, if left unchecked, 
it has great potential o f  narrowing the horizons o f civil authority over regional 
and other foreign policy matters. The upward spiral of conflicts in the region 
and strategies used to contain them suggests that the military and ministries of 
defence are gaining upper hand over diplomats and ministries of foreign affairs. 
In a word, gunboat diplomacy seems to be on the ascendancy and in the process 
superceding preventive diplomacy. The BDF has experienced a phenomenal 
growth in the recent past and is now estimated to the strength o f  about 10 000 
(Molutsi, 1997). The Botswana government is currently constructing a massive 
military base, the Molepolole air base, and upon completion, this will be the 
largest and most expensive air base in the Southern African region. Claiming 
a handsome 13% of the total public expenditure, defence spending in Botswana 
has involved, inter alia, acquisition of massive military equipment linked both 
to the air base and also the cross-border conflict with Namibia over the disputed
Kasikili island, which is still under consideration by the International Court of 
Justice (Campbell, 1997). This trend o f militarisation in the region partly also 
helps us understand why Botswana took part in a military solution to the 
Lesotho. The irony here, though, is that both Botswana and South Africa are on 
record vehemently disapproving o f military intervention in the Democratic 
Republic o f  Congo (DRC). Third, the contestation for regional power in 
Southern Africa after the demise o f apartheid may have been another factor that 
drove Botswana to intervene militarily in the Lesotho crisis along with South 
Africa. The on-going tussle between Mandela and Mugabe over the leadership 
o f the region which has already paralysed the SADC organ on Politics, Defence 
and Security, and may adversely affect the entire SADC formation, seems to 
have divided member-states into two political camps: (a) one led by South 
Africa which strives to have the SADC Organ institutionally subsumed under 
the Summit chaired by Mandela; and (b) the other led by Zimbabwe which 
strives to have the SADC Organ operate at the summit level in its own right and 
chaired by Mugabe (Tsie, 1998). Botswana, for instance, seems to have chosen 
to be in league with South Africa, while Namibia, among others, has chosen to 
go with Zimbabwe. Various military operations could be undertaken by each 
one of these factions in the name o f SADC, but most invariably the dominant 
interests will remain those o f dominant powers in each faction i.e. South Africa 
and Zimbabwe.
The military intervention in the Lesotho conflict is fraught with controversies. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the military operation in Lesotho does not, 
by any stretch of imagination, amount to a peacekeeping operation. Neither can 
it be characterised as a peace enforcement operation. It is simply a military 
intervention which does not have any place within the UN Charter, especially 
Chapters VI, VII and VIII (de Coning, 1998). Pre-requisites for either peace­
keeping or peace-enforcement operations within the UN framework are 
consent, impartiality and minimum use o f force (de Coning, 1998). The 
external military intervention did not get the consent o f  both parties to the 
conflict; neither was it impartial for it was meant to bolster a government; nor 
did it involve minimum use o f force judging by the scale o f  war that ensued and 
the casualty levels among both soldiers and civilians. Further more, this 
operation does not seem to have a formal mandate from SADC itself by a way
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of a Resolution emanating from a SADC Summit. The military intervention 
does not also have any formal sanction from the Organisation o f African Unity 
(OAU). 7 he military operation further raises technical questions of authenticity 
given that the three countries o f Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa do not 
share a common defence agreement. The 1994 Memorandum of Agreement that 
reinstated the then BCP government after a temporary displacement by the 
King which was overseen by Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe did not 
have a provision for military intervention in Lesotho’s political crises. The most 
plausible way to explain this military intervention is that it was both a strategy 
meant to protect South Africa’s strategic interests and an instrument to 
neutralise the army and force the parties to reach a negotiated settlement. 
Immediately, the South African troops wreaked havoc first around the Katse 
Dam in the Thaba-Tseka District and Maseru, the entire week beginning 
September 22, the country gravitated to the precipice of a civil war. Armed 
gangs went about confiscating vehicles, looting shops, burning buildings 
(business and private homes). Overnight a deep nationalistic campaign, heavily 
imbued with xenophobia, was on against foreign, especially South Africa, 
investors. The South African High Commissioner had to be quickly whisked 
away across the border and SADC troops organised convoys for other 
expatriates to seek temporary refuge in Ladybrand. Major towns in the 
lowlands, namely Maseru, Mafeteng, Mohale's Hoek and Butha-Buthe were 
turned into no-go areas by armed youth and the total damage caused is 
estimated at R160 million with 246 firms burnt down and about 4000 workers 
laid out o f work as a result. Victims of the political unrest and the concomitant 
violence include “those people killed (90), injured (200), in hiding (1000) and 
those who lost their jobs (4016)” (GOL, 1998:xi).
Alongside the military pressure, SADC managed to bring the parties to the 
negotiation table. In this manner, SADC entered the Lesotho conflict dangling 
the carrot for the parties to see value in reaching agreement and at the same 
time brandishing the stick to remind them which side their bread is buttered. In 
other words, the military intervention was to assure the ruling party a future in 
the post-negotiation phase, while at same time containing the armed offensive 
of the opposition elements. Political and military strategies were then used to 
resolve the Lesotho conflict. Although, ultimately a political settlement was
reached, resolution o f the security front o f  the conflict seems relatively difficult 
to realise.
The Political Settlement: Prospects for Stability and Democratic 
governance
The external military intervention went hand in hand with a negotiation process 
that was mediated by the South African Minister o f Safety and Security, Sydney 
Mufamadi. It was through this process that a political settlement was reached 
by all the parties to the conflict. The two key pillars o f settlement are (a) the 
retention o f the LCD as the ruling party, thus not acceding to the opposition 
demand for a government o f  national unity; and (b) the establishment of a 
Interim Political Structure (IPA), thus not allowing the LCD a free reign over 
preparations for the next election. The IPA comprises representatives o f  all the 
parties that contested the 1998 election. Its main objectives are:
• to prepare, in liaison with the legislative and executive organs o f the 
state, for a fresh election in the year 2000;
• to level the playing field for all parties and candidates to participate 
meaningfully in the election in an environment that promotes and 
protects human rights;
• to eliminate any impediments to legitimate political activity, including 
undue victimisation or intimidation;
• to ensure equal treatment o f  all political parties and candidates by all 
governmental institutions and in particular by all government-owned 
media, prior to and during the election (Government o f  Lesotho, 1998).
The formation of this body represents a positive development for future stability 
in Lesotho. Its effectiveness and the extent to which it contributes positively to 
stability will depend decisively on how the security front o f  the conflict is 
resolved. The negotiated political settlement has to dovetail and blend with an 
amicable solution o f the security front o f  the conflict. If the security front of the 
conflict deteriorates, for one reason or the other, it may cause serious reversals 
on the gigantic strides already made on the political front. In a nutshell, the 
future stability, peace and reconciliation in Lesotho is inextricably tied to how
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the present conflict is managed in its entirety. If it is botched up, it can only 
spell a perilous and ominous future. If it is managed well and diligently, it 
could pretty well spell a bright future for a country which has since 
independence been engulfed in protracted and unending political turmoil.
Besides the establishment o f  political stability, peace and reconciliation, the 
Lesotho state also faces a daunting task o f economic reconstruction and 
development. Lesotho’s already feeble and resource-poor economy has been 
adversely affected by the recent conflicts and instability. It is estimated that the 
reconstruction and development efforts will cost about M300 million “made up 
o f  reconstruction of private sector commercial and household dwellings of 
about M190 million ( . . .)  public sector reconstruction o f M75 million and 
replenishment of public vehicles of the order of M35 million. In addition, there 
is the loss o f  gross domestic product o f the order o f  M365 mi i 1 ion on account 
o f  the estimated 9.7 per cent decline o f GDP in 1998” (GOL, 1998:xvi).
Conclusion
It is quite evident that the 1998 political turmoil in Lesotho is not explicable by 
reference exclusively to one single factor, such as the election. Its roots lay 
deeper and its parameters were more broader than the election and the electoral 
system. In order to better understand this turmoil, systemic factors are very 
crucial, although individual actors had their own [unjfair share o f contribution 
to the crisis. In this paper, we have given pride o f place to structural crisis and 
institutional paralysis as our point of departure to make sense o f the root causes 
o f  the political turmoil. We have also argued that the conflict revolved more 
around contestation over state power, political participation and resource 
distribution. Management of the conflict took two primary forms: (a) military 
pressure, and (b) negotiation leading to political settlement. The conclusion that 
we draw is that the political settlement reached thus far may augur well for 
future stability and democratic governance, but this depends critically on how 
the settlement is managed. Although the Lesotho state faces bleak futures given 
both internal and external challenges, it has not yet collapsed a la Zartman 
(1995). By state collapse is meant “a situation where the structure, authority 
(legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart and must be
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reconstituted in some form, old or new” (Zartman, 1995:1). The prospect of 
state collapse in Lesotho is a real one if the political settlement thus far reached 
falls apart. Undoubtedly, consequences o f state collapse are too ghastly to 
contemplate.
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